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Abstract
It is often suggested that when opinions differ among individuals in a
group, the opinions should be aggregated to form a compromise. This pa-
per compares two approaches to aggregating opinions, linear pooling and
what I call opinion agglomeration. In evaluating both strategies, I propose
a pragmatic criterion, No Regrets, entailing that an aggregation strategy
should prevent groups from buying and selling bets on events at prices re-
gretted by their members. I show that only opinion agglomeration is able
to satisfy the demand. I then proceed to give normative and empirical ar-
guments in support of the pragmatic criterion for opinion aggregation, and
that ultimately favor opinion agglomeration.
Introduction
The chairman of an agricultural committee has commissioned a group of eco-
nomic experts to determine how likely the Food Price Index (FPI) will exceed 120
by 2025, given the rising number of droughts annually (the monthly FPI average
for 2020 is near 95). After reviewing the data, the members exchange their opin-
ions on the matter, but to no one’s surprise, the opinions differ. The group real-
izes, however, that in moving forward, they need to come to a reasonable com-
promise, if not a consensus, before briefing the chairman, but how?1 It is often
suggested that such a collective problem can be solved by aggregating the opin-
ions. In this paper, I will compare two strategies for aggregating opinions, the
popular linear pooling approach and what I call opinion agglomeration.
The way this paper differs from previous work on the subject is by its focus
on a pragmatic dimension of opinions, following de Finetti (1974), where a prob-
abilistic opinion of an eventX is viewed as the maximum price one is willing to
buy andminimum price they are willing to sell a bet that pays 1monetary unit in
caseX occurs, nothing otherwise. After extending this pragmatic interpretation
1The difference between a consensus and a compromise is that the former requires individuals
to continuously deliberate and revise their opinions until they reach an agreement, whereas the
latter requires individuals to find common ground for collective decision-making purposes, but
without necessarily changing their opinions (seeWagner 2009; Moss 2011).
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to collective opinions, I will propose a novel constraint, entailing that an aggre-
gation strategy should prevent groups from buying and selling bets on events at
prices regretted by their members. The felt regret in question is disappointment
over paying too much for a bet and similarly selling the bet for too little. The re-
gret is thus ex ante rather than ex post, as the negative emotion is conditioned on
acts that precede learning the outcomes that settle the bets.
With the pragmatic constraint imposed on opinion aggregation, I will show
that linear pooling fails to satisfy the demandwhen opinions differ provided that
a group’s losses from buying and selling bets at the prices yielded by the aggre-
gation strategy are perceived to be positive by somemembers, thus causing those
members to regret the group’s betting behavior. At best, linear pooling may elim-
inate the perceived loss from one of the two transaction types for all members,
but only if the Non-Dictatorship criterion is violated and the perceived loss from
the opposite transaction type is increased from the viewpoints of somemembers.
In comparison, I will show that opinion agglomeration satisfies the demand, as a
group’s losses from buying and selling bets at the prices yielded by the aggrega-
tion strategy are perceived to be zero by all members. Thus, no member regrets
the group’s betting behavior. Afterward, I will provide normative and empirical
arguments in support of the pragmatic criterion for opinion aggregation, and that
ultimately favor opinion agglomeration.
1 Two Aggregation Strategies
While there are many approaches to aggregating opinions (see Genest & Zidek
1986; Dietrich & List 2016), I will restrict the focus to just two in this paper, linear
pooling and opinion agglomeration. In this section, I will introduce the technical
details, along with reasons for why groups might adopt each strategy.
1.1 Linear Pooling
For a group of individuals i = 1, ..., n, let the set of events the group is concerned
with be a finite algebraA over a set of states Ω. CallA the group’s agenda. With
respect to the agenda, every individual i’s opinions are represented by a function,
pi : A → [0, 1], and pi ∈ ∆, where∆ is the set of all probability functions onA.
Call a collection of opinion functions for all i, (p1, ..., pn), an opinion profile, and
let∆n be the set of admissible opinion profiles. Finally, let the group’s opinions
be formed by a pooling function, F , mapping opinion profiles to∆.
The most common linear pooling model, and the one I will focus on in this
paper, is the following,
FL(p1, ..., pn)(X) =
n∑
i=1
wipi(X) ∀X ∈ A, (1)
wherewi is a non-negative weight representing individual i’s level of reliability or
expertise, and the sum of weights for all i is equal to one (Stone 1961). Simply put,
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the linear pooling function, FL, yields weighted averages of individual opinions
for all eventsX that represent the opinions of the group.
The pooling model introduced may already be familiar to those acquainted
with the epistemic peer disagreement literature, as it is a generalization of the so-
called equal weight model (see Jehle & Fitelson 2009). On an equal weight view,
peers should resolve their disagreements through the following,





pi(X) ∀X ∈ A. (2)
Besides settling peer disagreements, (2) is an efficient way of forming collective
opinions without having to invest time in determining the weight given to each
individual. But in case the group is committed to determining howmuch weight
each individual deserves, and every individual is given a say on the matter, the
group may face yet another problem, namely, disagreement over weighting as-
signments. To address the problem, some suggest that the individuals should re-
vise their opinions to weighted averages and iterate the procedure until all opin-
ions have sufficiently converged (DeGroot 1974; Lehrer 1976; Wagner 1978).
The formal setup is a bit different in the DeGroot-Lehrer-Wagner tradition.
Letwij , for i, j = 1, ..., n, be the weight that individual i assigns to every individ-
ual j, including i, and the sum of weights is equal to one. These weights reflect
personal opinions about every individual’s level of reliability or expertise from i’s
point of view and are situated as a row in a Markov matrix,
M =

w1 1, . . . , w1 n
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
wn 1, . . . , wn n
 , (3)









Theopinions are then aggregated repeatedly through iteratedmultiplication, and
as DeGroot (1974) showed, Pk defined asMkP converges to some opinion profile
P∞ such that no subsequent revision will change the limiting profile.2
Put inmore familiar terms, every individual i revises at step k to the following,







j (X) ∀X ∈ A. (5)
As k approaches infinity, opinions will sufficiently converge, and no further revi-
sion will change any one opinion in the profile. The upshot of adopting this iter-
ative procedure is that the group will arrive at a consensus as opposed to a mere
compromise. The underlying idea is that deliberation compels the individuals to
change their opinions, and by continuously repeating the process, the group will
eventually come to an agreement. Unfortunately, the consensus approach with
varying subjective weight distributions can be costly timewise.
If, however, the individuals showmutual respect, i.e., every individual allocates






p0j (X) ∀X ∈ A. (6)
Notice that mutual respect is the most efficient solution since a consensus is
reached after the first deliberation, thus making it computationally appealing.
What should be apparent to the reader at this point is that linear pooling con-
sists of a class of poolingmodels (larger than the twomentioned above) capable of
forming compromises for different occasions. Besides promoting a compromise,
I illustrated how weighted averaging also leads to a consensus through iterated
belief revision. Considering the benefits afforded by weighted averaging, pool-
ing by FL is often viewed as an attractive aggregation strategy.
1.2 Motivating Linear Pooling
There are at least two reasons for favoring linear pooling. The first comes from
discussions on peer disagreement (Christensen 2007; Elga 2007; Feldman 2007).
The popular conciliatory viewmaintains that peers shouldmove their opinions to-
ward one another after discovering that they disagree. Proponents contend that
a difference of opinion is evidence that each peer is liable for having made a mis-
take provided that no peer is assumed to be epistemically superior to another.
Such evidence is said to undermine the reliability of each peer’s reasoning on the
matter. And since there is no good epistemic reason to dismiss a peer’s opinion,
peers should welcome the evidence and take the middle ground for the time be-
ing. While there is debate over what the correct belief revision amounts to (see
Christensen 2011; Kelly 2013), many have suggested that peers should adopt an
equal weighted average, as it seems to be the most intuitive answer.
The second relates to “the wisdom of crowds” (Surowiecki 2005). In short, the
wisdom of crowds is the idea that groups outperform individuals in forecasting
and estimation tasks (under certain conditions such as the independence of every
opinion) and has been confirmed empirically. One of the earliest observations
traces back to Sir Francis Galton (1907), who reported that the median guess of
the weight of a “dressed” ox in a weight judging contest was within less than one
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percent of the ox’s true weight of 1198 lb. Although Galton highlighted the accu-
racy of themedian in the original paper, R. H.Hooker (1907) pointed out in a reply
that the arithmeticmean of 1196 lb., based on the numbers reported, wasmore ac-
curate than the median. In his response to Hooker, Galton provided the correct
arithmetic mean of 1197 lb. (only 1 lb. off the mark) versus the 1207 lb. median,
thereby confirmingHooker’s suspicion of themean beingmore accurate than the
median.3 Despite the ensuing dispute, whatwas discovered in the exchange is the
value of group estimates and predictions when opinions are averaged. Thus, the
wisdom of crowds provides a further reason for adopting at least a special case of
linear pooling given the accuracy of the average opinion.
1.3 Agglomerative Pooling
The second strategy I will consider and call opinion agglomeration requires a
more expressive imprecise probability (IP) framework (Moral & del Sagrado 1998;
Nau 2002; Stewart & Quintana 2018). For a group of individuals i = 1, ..., n, let
the group’s agenda once again be a finite algebraA over a set of statesΩ. With re-
spect to the agenda, every individual i’s opinions are represented by a non-empty,
convex set of probability functions, Pi ⊆ ∆, on the agenda.4 Call a collection of
set-based opinions for all i, (P1, ..., Pn), an opinion profile, and let Dn be the set
of admissible opinion profiles, where D is the set of all non-empty, convex sets
of probability functions. Finally, let the group’s opinions be formed by a pooling
function,F , mapping opinion profiles toD.
Themost natural agglomerative poolingmodel, and the one I will focus on in
this paper, is the following,
FA(P1, ..., Pn)(X) = conv(∪iPi(X)) ∀X ∈ A. (7)
Simply put, the agglomerative pooling function, FA, yields non-empty, convex
sets of probabilities for all eventsX , representing the opinions of the group.5 De-
spite the absence of a reliability or expertise factor, a form of equal weight is en-
coded, as the function’s output is invariant under permutations of individuals.
While pooling by FA may come across as a sensible way of agglomerating
opinions, some might question the convexity property provided that there are
cases inwhich non-convex sets of probability functions seem to bemore intuitive.
For example, if a group were to learn that a coin either has an exact bias of 0.6 or
3Galton remained committed to his preference for the median, despite confirming that the
arithmetic mean turned out to be a more accurate estimate.
4Note that ‘imprecise probability’ is conventionally used as an umbrella term that not only cov-
ers sets of probability functions, but also belief functions (Shafer 1976), Choquet capacities (Wasser-
man & Kadane 1990), possibility measures (Dubois & Prade 1988), lower previsions (Walley 1991),
and sets of desirable gambles (Walley 1991; Couso&Moral 2009). Although sets of probability func-
tions are not themost general, they subsume belief functions and possibilitymeasures and thus are
not the least general. The reason for choosing sets of probability functions here, however, ismerely
to follow the recent trend in epistemology (see Bradley (2019) for a survey on IP in philosophy).
5Stewart &Quintana (2018) suggest a rule along these lines as a way of generalizing the IP pool-
ing rule they focus on in their paper: conv{pi : i = 1, ..., n}.
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0.7 toward heads, then it would be wise to adopt a set consisting of probability
functions assigning just those two values toH rather than a set that also includes
the convex hull, as the latter encodes additional information. Thus, it seems that
convexity should be optional for agglomerative pooling, not mandatory.
Let me clarify that I only assume the convexity property here for mathemati-
cal convenience andmake no philosophical commitment to it like Levi (1974) and
Joyce (2010). But in case one insists on relaxing the convexity assumption, they
might prefer the following agglomerative pooling model instead,
F ′A(P1, ...,Pn)(X) = ∪iPi(X) ∀X ∈ A, (8)
whereP denotes a set of probability functions that is not necessarily convex (note
that the pooling function, F ′A, has a domain P(∆)n and range P(∆), where the
latter denotes the power set of delta). One advantage of the F ′A agglomerative
pooling function is that it preserves judgments about the independence of events.
That is, if all members of a group judge events X and Y to be stochastically in-
dependent,F ′A preserves their independence in the collective opinions, whereas
FA does not. There has beenmuchdebate over this issue in the literature (see e.g.,
Levi 1974; Kyburg& Pittarelli 1996), which goes beyond the scope of this paper, but
I have introduced (8) for those concerned about convexity.
As it should be apparent by now, opinion agglomeration, like linear pooling,
consists of a class of pooling models (larger than the twomentioned above) capa-
ble of forming compromises for different occasions. Although the agglomerating
methodmay not have the same level of appeal as weighted averaging, the pooling
function,FA, enjoys some nice properties as we will come to see.
1.4 Motivating Opinion Agglomeration
A reason for modeling opinions by imprecise probabilities is that individuals oc-
casionally form non-additive beliefs, as notably demonstrated byDaniel Ellsberg
(1961). In surveying decision theorists, one of the problems given involved bets on
drawing balls from two distinct urns. Participants were informed that urn 1 con-
tains a mixture of 50 red balls and 50 black balls, and urn 2 contains a mixture of
100 red and black balls in unknown proportions. They were asked to report their
preferences for a series of bets with equal prizes on randomly drawing a red ball
and drawing a black ball. Between two bets on a single urn, most were indiffer-
ent. Between two bets across urns, most reported a strict preference for the bet
on urn 1, e.g., a $100 or nothing bet on drawing a red ball from urn 1 was strictly
preferred to a $100 or nothing bet on drawing a red ball from urn 2.
The phenomenon described is known as ambiguity aversion. As Ellsberg
pointedout, a strict preference for a bet onurn 1 to abet onurn 2 cannot be charac-
terized by the traditional Savage axiomswhen indifferent towardbets on eachurn
individually. For such preferences on L. J. Savage’s (1954) view are inconsistent
and thus irrational. But the followers of Herbert Simon disagree. Simon (1955)
claimed that the optimality of judgments and decisions should be relativized to
an individual’s cognitive capacities and available information. Under this view,
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judgment and decision optimality should be thought of instead as bounded ra-
tionality (see Wheeler (2020) for a comprehensive survey). In following this tra-
dition, Gilboa & Schmeidler (1989) introduced a set of axioms, entailing a max-
imin expected utility decision rule, whereby a decision maker chooses an option
that maximizes minimum expected utility, relative to a convex set of probability
functions. Provided the extended decision framework developed by Gilboa and
Schmeidler, the reported preferences resulting from the Ellsberg experiments
can plausibly be explained (seeMachina & Siniscalchi (2014) and Gilboa &Mari-
nacci (2016) for recent surveys on ambiguity aversion).
Although ambiguity aversion might convey a need for imprecise probabili-
ties, the observed behavior only offers a reason to think that IP is useful for mod-
eling the judgments and decisions of individuals.6 However, Keller et al. (2007)
discovered that groups exhibit ambiguity aversion also. As part of their experi-
ment, they tested participants on an Ellsberg-like problem, first by one’s self and
then collectively in randomly formed dyads. In addition to replicating the find-
ings of Ellsberg, they found that the average amount dyads are willing to pay for
a bet on the ambiguous urn is less than the average amount individuals are will-
ing to pay for the same bet, implying that groups are evenmore ambiguity averse
than their members. What is more, the data suggest that the opinions of dyads
are some conglomerate of individual opinions given a larger difference between
the buying and selling prices of groups than that of individuals, thus furnishing
empirical evidence for compromising by agglomerating.
2 Desirable Criteria for Opinion Aggregation
In the previous section, I presented two strategies for aggregating opinions. In
this section, I aim to assess their plausibility by comparing them against a set
of desirable criteria that aggregation strategies arguably should meet. A hand-
ful of criteria for pooling functions have been proposed in the past, which I will
briefly review. Then, I will introduce a pragmatic criterion called No Regrets.
Distinct from the other criteria, the latter focuses on collective behavior. A rea-
son for introducing the criterion is that, as far as I know, there has been very little
to no attention given to pragmatic considerations for opinion aggregation. This
deficiency is quite surprising since a difference of opinion should, among other
things, prompt cautious group behavior if groups were to act on their opinions,
which the proposed criterion aims to accommodate in some form.
6Of course, ambiguity aversion is not the only reason for adopting imprecise probabilities.
Other considerations include accommodating suspension of judgment in probabilisticmodels (see
e.g., Levi 1983; Sturgeon 2010), respecting evidence (see e.g., Joyce 2005, 2010; Schoenfield 2012;
Konek forthcoming), and vague credence (see e.g., Lyon 2017). For comprehensive surveys on vari-
ous applications of imprecise probability, see Augustin et al. (2014) and Bradley (2019).
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2.1 A Brief Review of Some Desirable Criteria for Pooling Functions
Although a number of criteria have been proposed in the past (see e.g., Aczél &
Wagner 1980; McConway 1981; Genest & Zidek 1986; Garg et al. 2004; Dietrich &
List 2016; Stewart & Quintana 2018; Hartmann ms.), the following four regularly
appear in the literature due to the epistemic features they preserve.
(i) Unanimity. For all admissible opinion profiles (p1, ..., pn), if all pi
are identical, thenF (p1, ..., pn) = pi (in IP: for all admissible opinion
profiles (P1, ..., Pn), if all Pi are identical, thenF(P1, ..., Pn) = Pi).
(ii) Eventwise Independence or Weak Setwise Function Property.
There exists a function G : A × [0, 1]n → [0, 1] such that for
all admissible opinion profiles (p1, ..., pn) and events X ∈ A,
F (p1, ..., pn)(X) = G(X, p1(X), ..., pn(X)) (in IP: there exists a
function G : A× P([0, 1])n → P([0, 1]) such that for all admissible
opinion profiles (P1, ..., Pn) and eventsX ∈ A,F(P1, ..., Pn)(X) =
G(X,P1(X), ..., Pn(X))).
(iii) Boundedness. For all admissible opinion profiles (p1, ..., pn)
and events X ∈ A, F (p1, ..., pn)(X) is in the closed inter-
val [min(p1(X), ..., pn(X)),max(p1(X), ..., pn(X))] (in IP:
for all admissible opinion profiles (P1, ..., Pn) and events
X ∈ A, F(P1, ..., Pn)(X) is a subset of the closed interval
[inf∪iPi(X), sup∪iPi(X)]).
(iv) Non-Dictatorship. There is no individual i such that for all
admissible opinion profiles (p1, ..., pn), F (p1, ..., pn) = pi (in IP:
there is no i such that for all admissible opinion profiles (P1, ..., Pn),
F(P1, ..., Pn) = Pi).
The first two criteria trace back to early systematic studies on opinion pooling
(Aczél & Wagner 1980; McConway 1981). In short, the Unanimity criterion im-
plies that if all individuals hold the same opinions, then the collective opinions
should not differ. The Eventwise Independence criterion implies that the collec-
tive opinion for any eventX ∈ A should depend only on the individual opinions
ofX . Both of these criteria are straightforward and epistemically plausible.
The Boundedness criterion (Garg et al. 2004) implies that a pooled opinion
should not fall outside of the range of opinions expressed by the members of the
group. This criterion is reasonable, as the group agrees by default that the epis-
temically warranted opinion, based on the information available, is within the
range of expressed opinions. Any pooling function yielding a collective opinion
outside of the range respects none of the individual opinions. Furthermore, a
pooling function violating Boundedness is prone to underestimating or overes-
timating the probabilities of events with uncertain chances since, as empirical
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evidence concerning collective intelligence suggests, groups “bracket the truth.”7
The Non-Dictatorship criterion implies that no individual should determine
the group’s opinions no matter what. This is a reasonable constraint to impose
on pooling functions, especially for precise probabilities, provided that (non-
extreme) weighted averages will often be more accurate than any individual’s
opinions. The criterion is also plausible from an evidentialist point of view since
it, like Boundedness, maintains respect for the evidence (Feldman 2005). For
these reasons, the Non-Dictatorship criterion should appear to be feasible.
2.2 ‘Regret Averse’ Pooling
The above criteria for pooling functions aim at preserving features that serve the
epistemic interests of groups, but groups should also care about preserving fea-
tures that serve their practical interests. After all, why aggregate opinions if not
for guiding collective behavior? Let us turn our attention then to pragmatic crite-
ria. Whilemanymight exist, I will propose one relating to group betting behavior.
The idea is that an aggregation strategy should prevent groups from buying and
selling bets on events at prices regretted by their members.8 In this section, I will
flesh out the idea in full, but first, some preliminaries are in order.
The betting convention established by de Finetti (1974) assumes that every in-
dividual i is willing to buy and sell bets on eventsX ∈ A that pay 1monetary unit
if X occurs, nothing otherwise. For all individuals i and events X , let the max-
imum price i is willing to pay for a bet on X be represented by p−i (X), and the
minimumprice i iswilling to sell the bet be represented by p+i (X). OndeFinetti’s
view, an individual’s (precise) opinion pi(X) is their fair price for the bet such that
p−i (X) = p
+
i (X) = pi(X). By comparison, the buying and selling prices in IP
are canonically represented by a lower probabilityP−i (X) = infPi(X) and an up-
per probability P+i (X) = supPi(X), respectively. These prices need not be the
same, though. Hence, Pi need not be precise, i.e., a singleton set.
Regardless of whether opinions are precise or imprecise on some matter, all
rational individuals should agree on at least one thing. That is, no individual
7Easwaran et al. (2016) defend a family of updating rules with a property they call synergy, re-
sulting in opinions outside of the ranges of peer opinions. However, theymake it clear that they are
only concernedwith individuals updating their own opinions, not opinion aggregation, but Russell
et al. (2015) and Dietrich (2019) take up the group-level problem and defend an alternative pooling
strategy, namely, geometric averaging that also has the synergistic property. In addition to syn-
ergy, the geometric approach is externally Bayesian, meaning that pooling and conditionalization
commute. I bring these points to the reader’s attention to show that Boundedness is not entirely
uncontroversial, as it precludes geometric and multiplicative pooling, both of which have some
valuable properties. But in defense of Boundedness, Pettigrew (2019) shows that any aggregation
strategy violating the criterion is strictly worse in terms of accuracy than an aggregation strategy
satisfying it from the perspective of each individual. Thus, aggregation strategies that satisfy the
criterion yieldmore epistemic value than those that violate it (though, only in case of precise prob-
abilities).
8The concept of regret is not new to decision theory. Savage (1951) notably proposed the mini-
max regret decision criterion, and Loomes & Sugden (1982) exploited the notion in their influential
theory of regret-based preferences as an alternative to expected utility theory.
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should buy a bet on an event above or sell the bet below the buying and sell-
ing prices fixed by their opinion of that event, for the losses resulting from pay-
ing too much for the bet and selling it for too little are perceived to be positive
at prices above and below. Betting behavior that leads to such losses is regret-
table and should be avoided (see Elkin &Wheeler (2018) for a similar argument).
In making the latter idea explicit, for all prices u ∈ [0,∞), events X ∈ A,
and individuals i, let the aforementioned type of regret resulting from buying
and selling a bet on X for u be represented by r−i (u) and r+i (u), respectively,
where r−i (u) = max{u − pi(X), 0} and r+i (u) = max{pi(X) − u, 0} (in IP:
R−i (u) = max{u − P−i (X), 0} and R+i (u) = max{P+i (X) − u, 0}, for all
u ∈ [0,∞),X ∈ A, and individuals i).9
But howdo these functions capture the kind of regret suggested? The defined
regret functions can be made sensible in the following way. Assume that utility
is equal to monetary payoff and all individuals i evaluate risky acts according to
expected utility theory, or maximin expected utility theory in case of imprecise
probabilities. Considering a bet on an eventX , buying the bet for a price u ≥ 0
yields utility 1−u ifX occurs,−u otherwise. The value of buying the bet, ex ante,
for a priceu then is pi(X)(1−u)+(1−pi(X))(−u) = pi(X)−u, andP−i (X)−u
in case of imprecise probabilities, as it is the minimum expected utility:
min
p∈Pi
[p(X)(1− u) + (1− p(X))(−u)]
= min
p∈Pi
[p(X)− u] = P−i (X)− u.
The ex ante value of not buying the bet is, of course, 0. By opting to buy the bet
for a price u, the ex ante regret incurred is
max{value of not buying the bet− value of buying the bet, 0}
= max{0− (pi(X)− u), 0} = max{u− pi(X), 0}
(in IP: = max{0− (P−i (X)− u), 0} = max{u− P−i (X), 0}).
On the other side, selling the bet for a price u ≥ 0 yields utility u − 1 if X
occurs, u otherwise. The value of selling the bet, ex ante, for a price u then is
pi(X)(u−1)+(1−pi(X))(u) = u−pi(X), and u−P+i (X) in case of imprecise
probabilities, as it is the minimum expected utility:
min
p∈Pi
[p(X)(u− 1) + (1− p(X))(u)]
= min
p∈Pi
[u− p(X)] = u+ inf(−Pi(X))
= u− supPi(X) = u− P+i (X).
The ex ante value of not selling the bet is, of course, 0. By opting to sell the bet for
a price u, the ex ante regret incurred is
9The regret functions, properly defined, take prices, events, and opinions as arguments, but I
will abuse notation by writing the functions as done above for simplicity.
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max{value of not selling the bet− value of selling the bet, 0}
= max{0− (u− pi(X)), 0} = max{pi(X)− u, 0}
(in IP: = max{0− (u− P+i (X)), 0} = max{P+i (X)− u, 0}).
It should be clear at this point how the defined regret functions capture the (ex
ante) regrettable losses frombuying a bet for a price above one’smaximumbuying
price and selling the bet for a price below one’s minimum selling price.10
Suppose now that in addition to having a preference for not making bets
that are regretted, ex ante, by oneself, the individuals similarly have a prefer-
ence for the group not making bets that are regretted, ex ante.11 To satisfy the
latter preference for all individuals i, the pooling function F (or F ) adopted
should yield collective opinions such that no member regrets the group buying a
bet on an event X at the group’s maximum buying price F (p1, ..., pn)−(X) =
minF (p1, ..., pn)(X) and selling the bet at the group’s minimum selling price
F (p1, ..., pn)
+(X) = maxF (p1, ..., pn)(X) (in IP: F(P1, ..., Pn)−(X) =
infF(P1, ..., Pn)(X) and F(P1, ..., Pn)+(X) = supF(P1, ..., Pn)(X)). Put pre-
cisely,
(v) No Regrets. For all admissible opinion profiles (p1, ..., pn),
X ∈ A, and individuals i, r−i (F (p1, ..., pn)−(X)) = 0 and
r+i (F (p1, ..., pn)
+(X)) = 0 (in IP: for all admissible opinion profiles
(P1, ..., Pn),X ∈ A, and individuals i,R−i (F(P1, ..., Pn)−(X)) = 0
andR+i (F(P1, ..., Pn)+(X)) = 0).
The pragmatic criterion for pooling functions is seemingly intuitive, espe-
cially under the assumption that the individuals have a preference for the group
not making bets that are regretted, ex ante. But even so, some might worry that
satisfying the criterion will sometimes lead to abstaining from betting, and ab-
staining may cause group members to regret not betting. However, a regret of
not betting will onlymanifest ex post due to thinking about what could have been
obtained after learning an outcome that would have settled a bet the group con-
sidered making. That regret is different in kind, though, for it is not realized by
any individual’s regret functions, as defined above, and must be distinct from the
regret that is of concern. With a focus on the specified ex ante regret only, the
pragmatic criterion for pooling functions should come across as feasible.
10I owe many thanks to an anonymous referee for their valuable suggestions on justifying the
functional forms of the regret functions.
11Under this assumption, the individuals have a common interest in preventing the group from
losing money, but that commonality does not mean that they completely identify with the group,
for they might differ in opinion. Thus, it is supposed that the individuals have a common interest,
but may hold conflicting opinions. In many economic models, though, the opposite is typically
assumed—opinions are homogenous, but values are heterogeneous. While some might question
the move against convention, it is quite sensible in situations where opinions diverge, but group
members are all held accountable for any collective decisions made, e.g., policymaking. Thanks to
an anonymous referee for suggesting that I flag this subtle but important point.
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2.3 Some Observations
I have so far introduced a few desirable criteria for pooling functions. Any pool-
ing function satisfying the criteria should be considered plausible based on the
epistemic and practical features inherited. With a concern only for FL and FA,
let us see which of the criteria each meets.
Observation 1. The linear pooling function, FL, with domain ∆n satisfies
(i) Unanimity and (ii) Eventwise Independence.
Observation 1.1. The agglomerative pooling function,FA, with domainDn
satisfies (i) Unanimity.
Aczél & Wagner (1980) and McConway (1981) proved that FL satisfies (i) and (ii).
As for FA, when Pi, for all i, are identical, conv(∪iPi) = Pi. Thus, the pooling
function, FA, satisfies (i) Unanimity. While I do not have a proof showing that
FA satisfies (ii) Eventwise Independence, Stewart & Quintana (2018) proved that
a (convex) agglomerative pooling function satisfies the criterion (see Proposition
2). Their result can be extended to our setting, but I leave that to the reader.
At this point, it appears that linear pooling and opinion agglomeration are
both plausible strategies for aggregating opinions based on the above observa-
tions. But what about the other criteria?
Observation 2. The linear pooling function, FL, with domain∆n satisfies
(iii) Boundedness.
Observation 2.1. The agglomerative pooling function,FA, with domainDn
satisfies (iii) Boundedness and (iv) Non-Dictatorship.
(iii) Boundedness is a necessary property of FL since any
weighted average yielded by the function is in the closed interval
[min(p1(X), ..., pn(X)),max(p1(X), ..., pn(X))], which is the set of all weighted
averages of opinions, for all opinion profiles in the domain and X ∈ A. (iii)
Boundedness is a necessary property of FA since any output of the function
is a subset of the closed interval [inf∪iPi(X), sup∪iPi(X)] by definition, for
all opinion profiles in the domain and X ∈ A. Furthermore, FA satisfies (iv)
Non-Dictatorship since every individual’s opinion is contained in the output of
the function. That is, Pi(X) ⊆ FA(P1, ..., Pn)(X), for all opinion profiles in the
domain, individuals i, and X ∈ A. Whether FL satisfies (iv) Non-Dictatorship
depends on the weights assigned to individuals. In case some i is given weight
wi = 1, FL is dictatorial. Otherwise, if 0 < wi < 1, for all i, then FL satisfies
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(iv) Non-Dictatorship. It may be stipulated then that no individual is given
maximumweight to prevent pooling by FL from collapsing into a dictatorship.12
With the added stipulation, both FL andFA again appear to be plausible ag-
gregation strategies. So now, we only have one criterion left to consider, and the
one that interests me the most in this paper.
Observation 3. The linear pooling function, FL, with domain∆n violates
(v) No Regrets.
Observation 3.1. The agglomerative pooling function,FA, with domainDn
satisfies (v) No Regrets.
Observation 3 is easy to see. Suppose that for some non-unanimous opinion profile
in the domain and event X ∈ A, FL(p1, ..., pn)−(X) = FL(p1, ..., pn)+(X) =
FL(p1, ..., pn)(X), but there is at least one j such that pj(X) = y, y ∈
[min(p1(X), ..., pn(X)),max(p1(X), ..., pn(X))], and y < FL(p1, ..., pn)(X).
Then, (FL(p1, ..., pn)−(X) − y) > 0. Since r−i (u) = max{u − pi(X), 0}, for
all i, u ∈ [0,∞), and X ∈ A, r−j (FL(p1, ..., pn)−(X)) > 0. Therefore, FL vio-
lates (v) No Regrets.
Observation 3.1 is also easy to see. For all admissible opinion pro-
files and events X ∈ A, FA(P1, ..., Pn)−(X) = inf conv(∪iPi(X))
and FA(P1, ..., Pn)+(X) = sup conv(∪iPi(X)) by definition provided that
FA(P1, ..., Pn)(X) = conv(∪iPi(X)). Given the collective betting prices asso-
ciated with the pooling function FA, it follows that max{FA(P1, ..., Pn)−(X) −
P−i (X), 0} = 0 since (FA(P1, ..., Pn)−(X) − P−i (X)) ≤ 0 and max{P+i (X) −
FA(P1, ..., Pn)+(X), 0} = 0 since (P+i (X) − FA(P1, ..., Pn)+(X)) ≤ 0, for all
admissible profiles (P1, ..., Pn), eventsX ∈ A, and individuals i. Therefore, FA
satisfies (v) No Regrets.
Observation 3 does not bodewell for linear pooling. Those who favor it, how-
ever, might suggest weakening the No Regrets criterion by requiring instead that
the ex ante regret is zero for at least one transaction type for all individuals i. Weak-
ening the requirement may not only be an easy fix for linear pooling, but weak-
ening could also be justified on the grounds that some might care more about
12Although the pooling functionsFL andFA can satisfy the usual criteria, there is one that both
violate, namely, Probabilistic Independence. Laddaga (1977) highlighted that an agreement about
the independence of eventsX and Y is not preserved by taking any non-extremeweighted average
of opinions as a group’s opinion, and Lehrer & Wagner (1983) observed that only dictatorial lin-
ear pooling functions satisfy Probabilistic Independence. Thus,FL violates Probabilistic Indepen-
dence when 0 < wi < 1 for all i. But in defense of non-dictatorial linear pooling, Lehrer andWag-
ner contend that individuals and groups may have very little concern for newly established proba-
bilistic correlations between events since such dependencies are often artificial, resulting from the
formal machinery. However, others have pointed out that the practical consequences are not neg-
ligible (see e.g., Kyburg & Pittarelli 1996; Seidenfeld et al. 2010; Elkin &Wheeler 2018). As for FA,
the resulting set-based opinions contain all convex combinations, so there is some p ∈ conv(∪iPi)
such that p(X|Y ) ̸= p(X) for some admissible opinion profile and eventsX and Y . The reader
should note, though, that independence is more complex in IP (see e.g., Cozman 2012; Pedersen &
Wheeler 2014).
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avoiding buyer’s remorse and consequently value zero ex ante regret with respect
to r−i more than r+i (or vice versa if loss averse). Unfortunately, weakening No
Regrets in the way described leads to another problem for linear pooling.
Observation 4. For all admissible opinion profiles (p1, ..., pn), events
X ∈ A, and individuals i, if pj(X) ̸= pk(X), for all j and k,
FL(p1, ..., pn)(X) = x, and r−i (x) = max{x − pi(X), 0} = 0
or r+i (x) = max{pi(X) − x, 0} = 0, then FL violates (iv) Non-
Dictatorship.
Suppose that pj(X) ̸= pk(X), for all j and k, FL(p1, ..., pn)(X) = x, and
r−i (x) = max{x − pi(X), 0} = 0. If 0 < wi < 1 for all individuals i,
then x is in the open interval (min(p1(X), ..., pn(X)),max(p1(X), ..., pn(X))).
But because FL(p1, ..., pn)−(X) = x and r−i (x) = max{x − pi(X), 0} =
0, for all i, then x = min(p1(X), ..., pn(X)), which is not contained in
(min(p1(X), ..., pn(X)),max(p1(X), ..., pn(X))). So it is not the case that wi <
1 for all individuals i, and there must be some individual i whose opinion pi(X)
realizes min(p1(X), ..., pn(X)) and is given weight wi = 1, but then, FL violates
(iv) Non-Dictatorship. Similarly, one can follow this chain of reasoning with the
assumption that r+i (x) = max{pi(X)− x, 0} = 0 instead and arrive at the same
conclusion. Furthermore, it is not clear that weakening No Regrets is a feasible
fix. Notice that, under the above conditions, eliminating the perceived group loss
on one side can significantly increase the perceived group loss on the other side
from the viewpoints of some individuals when pooling by FL.
In summary, linear pooling fails to satisfy all the desirable criteria (i)-(v),
whereas opinion agglomeration satisfies all five. Note, however, that linear pool-
ing satisfies (i)-(v) if (p1, ..., pn) is unanimous, but in such instances, pooling is not
of much interest since it would be trivial. As it turns out then, opinion agglomer-
ation is the more plausible aggregation strategy of the two.
3 Justifying the Behavioral Criterion
Some might think that the reason I introduced No Regrets is to strategically un-
dermine linear pooling. In this section, I will offer justification for the criterion,
showing that it is indeed a reasonable constraint normatively and empirically to
impose on opinion aggregation.
3.1 Regret as an Emotion and its Avoidance
Therehas beenmuch talk about regret in this paper, butwhat is it? In short, regret
is considered a negative emotion in response to counterfactual reasoning about
a fault in personal action (Roese & Summerville 2005), or simply, counterfactual
emotion (Kahneman & Miller 1986). Described in more depth, Zeelenberg (1999)
offers the following account.
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Regret is a cognitive emotion: it is an emotion that needs cognition to
be experienced and that may produce cognitions as well. In order to
feel regret one has to think. One has to think about one’s choices and
the outcomes generated by these choices, but one also has to think
about what other outcomes might have been obtained by making a
different choice. Thus, regret is typically felt in response to decisions
that produce unfavorable outcomes compared to the outcomes that
the rejected option would have produced. (1999: 327)
To give an example of a regrettable decision, consider the following.
Lemon or Peach. You intend to purchase a used car today. You visit a lo-
cal car dealership, hoping to leave with a vehicle. There, you find
an attractive, used, mid-sized sedan priced at the top of your budget.
You are familiar with the model, but you are uncertain whether it is
of low quality, a lemon, or of high quality, a peach, in its used condi-
tion. Youultimately decide to buy the car anddrive away ahappy cus-
tomer. But your happiness is short-lived, for when you arrive home,
your neighbor, who is a professional mechanic, inspects the car and
discovers a major fault with the engine. He says, “This vehicle will
not pass a certified inspection and cannot be driven on public roads.”
Disappointment hits you, as you have come to learn that the car is a
lemon.
Your troubles in the given scenario beginwith an asymmetry in information.13
As the buyer, you are uncertain whether the used car is a lemon or a peach, but
the dealer knows which it is, and of course, will not reveal if it is a lemon. Despite
the information asymmetry, you buy the car, but later learn that it is a lemon.
Thinking about how the dealer successfully swindled themaximum from you for
a vehicle they knew tobeworth very little, you realize that itwouldhave beenwise
to pass on it instead. That realization and accompanying emotional pain is your
regret. While fictitious, the example portrays countless experiences of consumer
regret, which is a common side-effect of acting under uncertainty, and something
that rational individuals should generally seek to avoid.
The Lemon or Peach case was introduced for the purpose of generating
thoughts about what it is like to be in a distressing state of regret after a decision
has been made and the true state of the world is learned, but to reiterate, the No
Regrets criterion concerns ex ante regret. Since the latter kind of regret is thought
about less often, though, some might wonder what can cause it. Consider, for
example, the collective behavior in a variation of Lemon or Peach.
Lemon or Peach–Group. You and your partner intend to purchase a used
car today with a maximum budget of $10,000. You go together to a
13The Lemon or Peach case is inspired by the main example of George Akerlof ’s (1970) seminal
paper, “The Market for Lemons: Quality, Uncertainty, and the Market Mechanism.”
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local car dealership, hoping to find a vehicle. There, an attractive,
used, mid-sized sedan priced at $10,000 catches your attention. You
and your partner are both familiar with the model but are uncertain
of what it is worth in its used condition. You say, “I think it is worth
the asking price, so we should buy it.” Your partner, however, says, “I
think that it is worth no more than $6,000.” In light of this dispute,
you suggest compromising and offering the dealer $8,000. Your part-
ner is still reluctant to believe that the car is worthmore than $6,000,
but they agree, regretfully, to making the bid for the sake of compro-
mising. The dealer accepts, and you jointly purchase the car. When
you arrive home, your neighbor, who is a car appraiser at a presti-
gious appraisal firm, yells over at the two of you in a sarcastic tone,
“How much did you pay for that thing?” You both reply, “$8,000.”
She replies, “In that condition, the car is worth at most $6,000!”
A notable difference here from the first case, aside from an individual/group dis-
parity, is that an additional state of regret is experienced, which occurs before
learning the actual value of the car. The bid itself was immediately regretted by
your partner. That regret is thus ex ante rather than ex post.
A lesson that can be drawn from the second case, and that further supports
a principle like No Regrets, is that if you had heeded the warning of your part-
ner, the two of you may have avoided the distress later felt. Put another way, had
the two of you compromised in a fashion such that neither of you regretted the
group’s bidding price, the group would have decided differently, resulting in less
grief. So the No Regrets criterion is not only justified on the basis of prevent-
ing group members from experiencing the unwanted emotion, ex ante, but also
on the grounds that it can be instrumental in preventing group members from
experiencing regret, ex post. For an expressed ex ante regret by a group member
forewarns of an ex post regret that is still to come, just as in the second case.
3.2 Aversion to Making Bad Deals: Experimental Evidence
It is widely known that the judgments and decisions of actual, not idealized, in-
dividuals often deviate from those predicted by expected utility theory. When
endowed with a good, for instance, an average person will likely be reluctant to
sell the good for the same price that they would buy it, giving rise to the so-called
endowment effect (Thaler 1980). Tversky & Kahneman’s (1991) explanation for why
the endowment effect arises is that utility is reference-dependent, exchanging a
possession for amodest gain is viewed as a loss relative to an individual’s reference
point, and individuals are averse to losses.
For decades, many behavioral economists have attributed the endowment ef-
fect to an aversion to losing possessions. However, recent evidence casts doubt
on the view that loss aversion is the only plausible explanation for a gap between
‘willingness to pay’ and ‘willingness to accept’. Weaver&Frederick (2012) hypoth-
esized that a difference between buying and selling prices for a good is sometimes
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a result of an aversion tomakingbaddeals. Theypredicted that bymanipulating a
subject’s reference price for a good, ‘willingness to pay’ would largely differ from
‘willingness to accept’. If the prediction is true, then the endowment effect is a
consequence of an aversion tomaking bad deals as opposed to an aversion to los-
ing the good, for the relevant factor is the reference price, not the good itself. The
results of their experiments confirmed the prediction.
In their first experiment, for example, participants were presented with four
different kinds of candy typically sold at movie theaters and asked to indicate
their favorite. Participants were either endowed or not endowedwith their choice
and assigned to a high or moderate reference price condition. In the high condi-
tion, participants were informed that their chosen box of candy sells for $4.00 at
the Harvard Square Theater (near Harvard University). In the moderate condi-
tion, participants were told that the box of candy sells for $1.49 at a local Target
retail store. The experimenters then elicited themaximumbuying andminimum
selling prices from participants following the Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak
(1964) method. They found in the high condition a significant difference in prices
(µsell = $2.88, µbuy = $1.54) (2012: 698). Although these results only illustrate a
higher average selling price upon inflating participants’ reference prices, I refer
the reader to the results of Experiments 3a and 3b, which confirm a lower average
buying price upon depressing participants’ reference prices.
What can we make of these experimental results? A first observation is that
individuals appear to be keen on avoiding ex ante regret when transacting due to
an aversion to making bad deals. Whether groups exhibit similar behavior is an
open question, but the No Regrets criterion is at least empirically tenable, as it
quantifies over individuals in a group. A second observation is that individuals
appear to be inclined to revise their judgments after receiving information that
shifts their reference prices, raising the question: will individuals form imprecise
opinions after learning the opinions of other group members due to an aversion
tomaking bad betting deals? Although I amunable to pursue the question in this
paper, the empirical results discussed have interesting implications for a behav-
ioral theory of individual and group opinions and pave the way for future work.
4 Conclusion
In summary, I showed that opinion agglomeration fares better than linear pool-
ing in satisfying the desirable criteria laid out in section 2. Trouble for linear pool-
ing surfaced when considering the pragmatic criterion, No Regrets, since aside
from pooling a unanimous opinion profile, linear pooling fails to satisfy it. Even
under a weakened version, linear pooling was shown to be no better off, as it then
violates theNon-Dictatorship criterion. After presenting the formal results, I pro-
ceeded to give normative and empirical arguments in support of the pragmatic
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